Analysis and Development of Fail-Operational Automotive Mechatronic Systems

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Abstract: Ongoing advances in mechatronic components and power electronics help to improve control systems within automotive applications. New developed or designed components enable more efficient system architectures and control. The management of several parameters of future drive architectures, such as high torque and power output, high system efficiency, low mass, low energy consumption, very low exhaust gas emissions, and low costs is essential for future propulsion concepts. Based on these development trends, mechatronic systems within automotive engineering are gaining more and more importance. At the same time, quality and safety requirements become challenging for automotive manufacturers as well as their suppliers regarding the reduction of the initial risk and increase of component reliability in a high degree. Therefore, safety-relevant aspects in the development of modern mechatronic systems have to be considered thoroughly. The high number of technical properties and complex connections of mechatronics systems in the development of modern vehicles are very challenging for state-of-the-art analysis methods. For this reason, new and innovational safety concepts are required to optimize existing safety concepts using conventional components and methods in combination.

This paper includes a detailed comparison of different analysing methods to identify systematic and random failures, as well as safety standards such as IEC 61508 (Functional Safety of Electrical/Electronic/Programmable Electronic Safety-related Systems) and ISO 26262 (Road vehicles – Functional safety). To fulfil safety standards nowadays for complex mechatronic systems, several different analysis methods have to be applied. Only the connection of a safe fault recognition with a safe fault reaction enables a system to avoid harmful consequences. Regarding product development, there is an ongoing change from routine tests (durability tests) to testing selected parts of a safety function (fault injection tests). How action is taken is changing, with a trend towards a further development of IT tools, supporting functional safe systems holistically, including hazard analysis and risk assessment, integrated system analysis of systematic and random failures, and hardware metrics. The publication closes with an overview of a functional safety concept and presents an outlook to future trends of safety systems analysis.

Keywords: Failure Mode and Effects Analysis FMEA, Fault Tree Analysis FTA, IEC 61508, ISO 26262, Automotive Safety Integrity Level ASIL, Fail-Operational, Automotive Mechatronic Systems, Drive Architectures.

1. Introduction

The increasing amount of electronic components and use of electro-mechanical actuators in the automotive sector raises reliability and system integrity needs. As removing mechanical back-up systems is more and more considered, safety related electronic structures must be designed to work under any circumstances. As failure rates for electronic components are higher than for mechanical ones, the skill lies in creating reliable structures out of less reliable elements. Redundancy in software and hardware are the keys to overcome reliable products from single point failures. A combination of these approaches allows a creation of a structural design, which can deal with a restricted number of failures [1].
The use of electronic components in safety related systems in automotive applications is steadily increasing. In order to achieve an equal or higher safety level as with pure mechanic components, these components are designed with a fail-safe redundancy level. Fail-safe signifies that the component is transferred into an active or passive safe state when a failure occurs. In case of a passive safe state, all concerning interfaces are silenced in order to exclude any interference of peripherals or other functions. On one hand fail-safe means a protection of the remaining system from disturbance, but on the other hand the availability of the component suffers from this technique. Dependent on the implemented function of the component, the function might have a very high priority for the system, and therefore its availability is essential [1], [2].

For driving assistance systems, electronic components are essential parts which allow fast controlling of the actuators. The state of the art for saving assistance functions is fault tolerance at fail-safe level. On assumptions that the average driver can control the car without the assistance systems, the fail-safe level is completely appropriate. Considering that the younger generation never had experience with driving without electronic assistance systems and are completely accustomed to it, moving to fault tolerant topologies is recommended [2], [3].

The origin of fail-operational architectures lies in aeronautic engineering. Aviation needed technical implementations which provide functionality under any circumstances during the whole flight. Different from other industry sectors, failure in safety critical functions could not be solved with transition to a safe state. As the safe state of an airplane is reached when it is landed, sending functions which keep the plane operational while flying to a silent state do not increase the safety of the plane. Strategies needed to be applied to keep vital functions operational at any cost. Precautions had to be taken in order to reduce the risk of losing essential functions to an acceptable low level. These precautions were the implementation of redundancy in order to achieve operational behaviour even after several failures of the same item [1], [4].

2. Common Strategies for Fail-Operational Systems

Whether a fail-operational level or a fail-silent level of fault tolerance is required, redundancy is mostly the key of implemention. A classic distinction into software and hardware related areas leads to following strategies:

- Static Hardware redundancy
- Dynamic Hardware redundancy
- Static Software redundancy
- Dynamic Software redundancy.

2.1. Static Hardware redundancy

The most widespread hardware method is static redundancy combined with a majority voting, also called M-n-Systems. Within this method, critical elements of a safety related item are multiplied. They are fed with the same inputs and provide, if functionally correct, the same output. To determine if an output is correct or not, all outputs from the elements are fed to a voter. The voter then compares the outputs of the multiplied elements and assumes that the output given by the majority is the correct one. Only the result of the majority voting is forwarded to the item which needs the information. Possible wrong outputs are suppressed as long as not the majority of the elements deliver wrong outputs at the same time. Elements which deliver repeatedly wrong outputs can be masked and excluded from the voting. In this case, a degradation of the fault-tolerance level takes place, as depicted in Fig. 1 [1], [5].

Depending on the required tolerance level of the application, critical elements are doubled, tripled, or quadrupled to stay operational after one, two, or even three failures of the same item. In principle, any amount of elements and majority number is possible in M-n-Systems, where \( m \) describes the limit needed for the majority, and \( n \) the amount of elements used. The minimum set for majority voting, a 2 out of 3 system, is also called Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR) and can still operate after one element fails. After one failure, TMR degrades to a Duplex System where the Voter only compares the outputs of the elements instead of a majority voting. If both outputs are equal, a correct state of the elements is assumed. The Duplex system needs to shut down when another element fails, since there is no guarantee if the remaining single element gives right values or not. Through a plausibility check it is possible to prove if the value is within a realistic range. Element failures
which manipulate output values to a level that normally could occur in reality are not detectable. In safety related applications, this insecurity cannot be accepted [5], [7].

![Diagram of static hardware redundancy approach with voter topologies](http://dx.doi.org/10.17758/UR.U0915115)

Fig. 1: Static hardware redundancy approach with voter topologies [1], [6].

A weak spot of M-n topologies are occurring failures in the voter itself: if the voter fails, the whole item fails. To overcome this situation, a Duo-Duplex system with two independent items can be used. Also topologies that triple the voter, a so called triple-triple redundancy, are a promising way of overcoming voter failures [1], [7].

2.2. Dynamic Hardware redundancy

A downside of M-n systems is the simultaneously outwearing of parallel elements and the increasing power consumption with every added element. The redundant elements are running for the same amount of time and experience the same extent of ageing. An approach to improve the unnecessarily outwearing is given by a dynamic reconfiguration strategy. This strategy has only one element running at a time operating and the other redundant elements are shut down (cold standby). A fault detection system has to monitor the operating element whether its function is correct or not. If the element fails, a sleeping redundant element is turned on and replaces the defect one. This of course, takes some reconfiguration time which is a critical factor for the system recovery. Another crucial factor is the fault detection routine by itself since this system works only as good as its fault detection does. Using fail-silent elements, which do not give any output when an internal failure occurs, simplifies the fault detection [1], [5].

2.3. Static Software redundancy

N-version programming is an analogue approach in software as M-n systems implementation in hardware. Several code routine alternatives are programmed independently for the same specification. The main and the alternative software are executed simultaneously, their outputs are compared and only a correct value is forwarded. To supply independence, other programming teams, other software languages, and other compilers are used. This increases the costs, complicates documentation, and maintenance of the item. Analogous to the hardware, this diversity concept protects the software from systematic failures. Only failures in the specification are not covered [1], [5], [7].

2.4. Dynamic Software redundancy

Recovery blocks are a dynamic redundancy concept in software. Within a recovery block, several code alternatives realizing the same function are offered, same as in n-version programming. Instead of running all alternatives simultaneously, only one alternative runs at a time and its output is checked afterwards by an acceptance test. If the acceptance test detects an error, the previous state is restored and the next code alternative is chosen. When there are no more alternatives left, the whole software item fails. As a protection against failures resulting from transient hardware failures, the same code alternative can be repeated.

Problems may arise through intercommunication of a running code alternative with other processes outside the recovery block followed up by a failed acceptance test. Other processes need to be informed about the corrupted outcome of the process and their received data, otherwise corrupted data is assumed to be correct, which leads to a distribution of the failure within the system, as shown in Fig. 2 [1], [7].
Fig. 2: Dynamic software redundancy with several code alternatives, an acceptance test, and a recovery mechanism according to [1], [7].

3. Propulsion system of an electric vehicle

The presented redundancy strategies from the former section shall now be taken into account to form an economic fault tolerant architecture for automotive purposes. A generic architecture and an assessment procedure shall be developed which implements fault tolerance for a specific time interval and with reduced performance. For examination purposes, the propulsion system of a rear powered electric car with a powerful power train is assumed.

3.1. Basic architecture

A systematic view of the basic architecture is shown in Fig. 3. and consists of following components:

- A rechargeable energy storage system (RESS) containing a high voltage (HV) battery and a battery management system (BMS).
- A DC/DC converter supplies the low voltage network over the HV battery
- A dashboard ECU builds a human machine interface to give relevant system information to the driver.
- The gas pedal detects the torque request of the driver and forwards it over the bus system.
- The central ECU determines a set torque for the power inverter and motronic.

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- The position encoder provides angle information of the actual rotor position.
- The power inverter and motronic performs a field orientated closed loop control of the machine.
- The permanent excited synchronous machine (PSM) produces the output torque given to the rear axle over the differential gear (DG).

The signal flow from the driver to the electric machine, as long as no error occurs, can be seen in Fig. 4:

![Diagram of signal flow from driver to electric machine](http://dx.doi.org/10.17758/UR.U0915115)

Fig. 4: Signal flow from the driver torque demand to the machine output [9].

As electric machines are connected to the tyres with no clutch in-between, there is no mechanical way to disconnect the motor from the drive axle. Fluctuations of torque or too high/lowl engine break therefore directly affect the vehicle behaviour and can lead to a loss of stability. The basic architecture must provide fail-safe behaviour to avoid hazards caused by too high/lowl engine break.

Any component failing inside the signal flow leads to a loss of the propulsion system and a transition to a passive safe-state of the same. The low availability of this system is obvious and also several scenarios were identified with the help of a HARA (Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment) where avoiding accidents highly relies on correct function of the propulsion system. An extension of the basic architecture in order to achieve fail-operational behaviour is intended to suppress accidents caused by a loss of the propulsion system. For instance overtaking on a country road with oncoming traffic or getting in lane on an intersection with no traffic light regulations are critical if the propulsion is lost while carrying out these manoeuvres.

### 3.2. Fail operational architecture

To overcome the safety issue in case of loss of the propulsion system, the basic architecture components were extended or replaced to provide a fail-operational behaviour as shown in Fig. 5. The components were revised as follows:

- The DC/DC Converter is doubled to avoid a loss of the energy supply of the low voltage network.
- The gas pedal is retrofitted to a Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR) which implements a 2 out of 3 majority voting.
- The Bus System is upgraded to a dual-channel Flexray System which transfers the same data over two separated twisted pair connections.
- The central ECU is now a fail-operational unit made out of two fail-silent ECUs with hot standby. The ECU 2 always has the same state as the ECU 1 and an intelligent switch puts the signals of ECU 2 on the output as soon as the error detection does not receive a signal from ECU 1.
- The electric machine is exchanged to a dual stator winding 6-phase PSM. This machine type consists of two 3-phase subsystems which are separately controlled by two inverters. This leads to a higher output torque while no fault is present and to a nominal output torque of 40% in case of only one remaining inverter [8].

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• The Power Inverter & Motronic is doubled to control the subsystems of the dual winding machine. The output power of the inverters can be reduced, which also lowers their cost.

• As backup system for the position encoder, a sensorless controlling is implemented inside the Motronic.

The fail-operational architecture ensures independence against single point failures of any component of the architecture, with focus on components inside the chosen system border. The signal flow between driver and machine of the fail-operational architecture can be seen in Fig. 6.

4. Conclusion and Outlook

The increasing amount of electronic components in safety related environments creates a need for smart architectures that can compensate single failures of its components. In all cases a HARA is in charge to identify and assess safety related systems as proposed by the ISO 26262. Systems or components which are evaluated with an ASIL A or higher are legitimate candidates for fail-operational architectures.
The proposed architecture in this paper provides fail-operational behaviour with at least 40% nominal output torque in case of a fault of the PSM or one of the Power Inverter & Motronic blocks. In all other single point failure scenarios the full performance is still available for the driver. Moreover, a slightly increased output torque of 5% is sustained by the six phase machine compared to a three phase machine of the same size [8].

Future research should include an economic assessment of the fail-operational architecture. Not only additional costs of the components need to be incorporated, but also the time and effort required for identifying the vulnerabilities of the architecture. The highest potential for lowering component cost surely lies in reduced performance for a determined amount of time after one failure which only provides a limp home state rather than full performance until the next fault. With this approach, cheaper components could be implemented as redundant backup to the architecture.

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